What made the fourth Eelam war a military success?

• Doctrine, tactics, coordination and leadership

 By Ranga Jayasuriya

It would be a matter of days before the military would deliver the final blow to the remainder of the LTTE, effectively bringing an end to the military chapter (at least the conventional part) of the separatist insurgency, which haunted this country for over three decades. The final military assault would aim at the annihilation of the LTTE, yet its success would decide the future nature of the LTTE’s strategy. Should Prabhakaran succeed in his attempt to escape from Sri Lanka, he is in a position to reorganize the movement, given that its fund raising apparatus in the Europe is not affected.

Elimination

However, the elimination of Prabhakaran along with the top leadership, who are now holed up in the ‘no fire zone’ would effectively destroy the command structure of the LTTE, which would severely deter any future reorganization. That is obviously the military’s objective as it vindicated in pronouncements by both the military and political leaders. 
This would also be one of the rare occasions in the history of intra state conflicts where one party wins through the annihilation of the other. The practitioners of guerrilla warfare are generally immune to the strategy of annihilation due to specific advantages enjoyed by the guerrillas against conventional military forces. The guerrilla strategy is to wane the state through the use of the strategy of attrition thereby severely eroding the government’s will to fight.
However, what is interesting in the Sri Lankan context was that the Sri Lankan army deployed the very strategy of attrition against the LTTE rather than opting to the massive conventional attacks as in the past. Three years since Mavil Aru, the commander of the army, General Sarath Fonseka says 18,000 guerrillas have perished in the battle during the said period. Facts on the ground and the waning resistence of the LTTE speak on his behalf. What made the Sri Lankan military destroy the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in three years is indeed an achievement, which is in stark contrast to the first 20 years of separatist insurgency?

Success

The success is, of course, attributed to all the agencies of national power - military, diplomacy, and information and political; yet, a few points stand out in any evaluation of the winning formula in the recent military operations 
(I)Doctrine: The military operations prior to 2006 (i.e. pre Sampur) followed the conventional military tactic according to which one or several military divisions advanced on the main roads. For instance during operation Jayasikuru, columns of tanks and infantry advanced on the A9 main trunk road. The objective was to capture the territory controlled by the Tigers. However, advance on the open land in columns exposed the troops to artillery and mortar fire. Since 1995, the main culprit of the casualties of the Sri Lankan forces was indirect fire. 
In contrast, Special Forces and special infantry operation (SIO) platoons were deployed in small team operations in the military operations since 2006 thereby effectively minimizing casualties caused by indirect fire. In the past, advance of troops on a single front, deep into enemy territory enabled the Tigers to exploit the depth of the territory in order to deploy the tactics of ‘Defence in Depth’, according to which the enemy enabled the troops to advance deeper into their territory and attack when the troops loss momentum. Counter attacks executed in this manner had been instrumental in the reversal of Operation Jayasikuru.
Whereas the recent military operations were carried out on multiple fronts. Four fronts were open in Mannar, Vavuniya and Weli Oya and the northern front of Muhamaial throughout the military operations. That outstretched rebel resources, denying them the opportunity to mobilize resources on a single front.
(II)Strategy: The objective of the previous military operations was the capture of territory, mainly through the capture of main towns and supply routes. However, this enabled the Tigers to retreat to jungles where they regrouped and launched major counter attacks retaking the territory. Kilinochchi, the main town of the Alpha 9 trunk road was first captured in the late 1990s with the operation Sathjaya, but the rebels, who withdrew to the jungles, retook it in months.

Main objective

Whereas the main objective of the recent military operations was the attrition. Heavy emphasis was placed on the attrition of the maximum possible number of enemy combatants. The capture of the land was secondary. The undeclared army motto was “don’t die for our land, let them die for theirs”
The LTTE’s obsession with its “homeland” in turn played into the military objective. The rebels offered stiff resistance at the borders of former forward defence lines, most notably was what is called the “Mannar Rice Bowl”. Heavy resistance in turn resulted in heavy casualties for the rebels. Since the capture of Rice Bowl, the troops recorded rapid gains. 
What, indeed, happened was that the rebels who put heavy resistance at the initial stage, crumbled later due to heavy attrition inflicted on them during the last three years. The commander of the army says over 18000 rebels have been killed during the period. That also explains the absence of any major counter attack by the guerrillas during this period with the exception of the last two months when the LTTE finally mustered all its resources to a sliver of land to fight to avoid annihilation. 
(III)Coordination: What is equally important in the recent military operations is coordination among the tri- forces as well as the various branches of the intelligence agencies. Accurate intelligence is key to a successful counter insurgency campaign... Also the intelligence sharing with foreign intelligence services was extremely effective and instrumental in the destruction of arms smuggling vessels of the LTTE off the Indonesian waters. This has also been instrumental in foiling a number of rebel attempts to conduct major terrorist attacks in the capital and in the South. 
(IV) Leadership: The last, but not least, major drive of the military success was the political and military leadership, provided by President Mahinda Rajapaksa.
Interestingly, the President appointed Lt General Sarath Fonseka who was sidelined by former President Chandrika Kumaratunga on political grounds, as it was known among the military and media circles. The ability to look beyond party politics is partly instrumental in shaping a coherent military strategy. Also the government increased military spending to the present 1. 6 billion US Dollars in order to modernize the forces. Modernization of the security forces such as the newly added Mechanized Infantry Regiment was largely instrumental in the rapid progress of the 55 Division when it began advancing from Muhamalai.

Advance

Meanwhile, last week, the 59 Division began to advance from their forward localities at the edge of the Mullaitivu town marching towards the remnant of the guerrilla held areas inside the ‘no fire zone’. Earlier, the 59 Division was assigned with a holding role in order to guard against any guerrilla effort to break through the defence lines to infiltrate Iranamadu. Last week, Brigadier Prasanna Silva, former General Officer Commanding of the 55 Division, which advanced from Muhamalai to Puthumattalan, was appointed General Officer Commander 59 Division. He succeeds Major General Nandana Udawatta who will be appointed as the Overall Operation Commander, Anuradhapura, a position currently held by the one time military spokesman and veteran Infantryman Major General Sanath Karunaratne. Major General Karunaratne is expected to retire having reached 55 years.

Minimum military casualties

The appointment of Brigadier Prasanna Silva was the precursor for the advance of the 59 Division from its defended localities bordering the Nandikadal lagoon. Brigadier Prasanna Silva, then as the Commander of the Special Forces Brigade played a major role , along with the then General Officer Commanding, 23 Division, Major General Daya Ratnayake in liberating the Tiger enclave of Vakarai with minimum military casualties.
With the advent of the 59 Division, three military divisions are pushing into the remnant of the guerrilla held area. The 58 and 55 Divisions are advancing along the lagoon and the coast respectively, while the 59 Division moves northward from Mullaitivu. The LTTE is facing double envelopment by the security forces, a centuries old military tactic, excelled by Hannibal in the battle of the Canoes in 2nd century BC.
By Friday, the 58 Division negotiated another trench cum earth bund built by the Tigers in Karayamullivayykkal. The bund, which was 8 feet in height cut through the narrow land strip from the coast to the A 35 Mullaitivu-Paranthan road. The LTTE launched four waves of counter attacks which were repulsed by the troops.
Troops operating in small teams attacked the LTTE positions, forcing them to retreat. The Unmanned Aerial Vehicles hovering over the ‘no man zone’ captured the visual of fleeing Tiger cadres. 
There is approximately a 4 km stretch of land still being held by the Tigers. There is an estimated 15,000-20,000 civilians according to government figures and twice as much according to some NGOs are held up by the Tigers in this territory. Military officials from the battle front said that the LTTE’s resistance is becoming disorganized and uncoordinated and that cadres appear to be fighting as there was no other option. The surrender does not go down well in the vocabulary of the LTTE, the epitome of suicide terrorism. However, the numbers of defectors are swelling. Analyzing the nature of resistance, military officials confided that several hundred cadres who were recently recruited by the LTTE would surrender at the first opportunity.
However, with conventional combat coming to an end, the government would have to strike a new strategic paradigm in order to transform military gains into a sustainable political settlement. 
This requires a multi pronged strategy dealing with the political, military and economic fronts in order to win the hearts and minds of the people, who are, it is widely accepted, the centre of gravity of the insurgency. Failing with this, the government would lose the peace, even after having won the war.